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Too

MUCH PROTECTION WITH Too LITTLE SUPPORT:
LOOK AT THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN LIGHT OF
GARCIA V. BOARD OF EDUCATION

A

INTRODUCTION

When a party files suit against a state in federal court there exists
the possibility of the action being barred under the eleventh amendment
to the Constitution of the United States. When a suit is filed against an
agency of the state, such as a highway commission, port authority,
ratemaking commission, or school board, a determination must be made
as to the extent of the amendment's protection. If the state agency is the
"alter ego" or "arm" of the state,' then it qualifies for protection
from
suit under the amendment. If however, the entity is deemed to be a
"citizen" of the state, immunity under the eleventh amendment will
not

apply.
Garcia v. Board of Education2 is the Tenth Circuit's latest attempt to
decide whether local school boards qualify as alter egos of the State of
New Mexico, and are therefore entitled to protection under the eleventh
amendment. The focus of this discussion will be on the Garcia court's
decision to allow eleventh amendment protection to extend to local
school boards and the problems that arise from the court's failure to

provide adequate precedent in support of such a decision. 3
I.

THE GARCIA CASE

J. Placido Garcia brought a section 19834 action against the Board
of Education of the Socorro Consolidated School District in New Mexico. Garcia's claim arose out of the school board's decision not to renew
his contract as superintendent for the school district. 5 The plaintiff
I. Factors which may constitute an adequate relationship between an agency and a
state to qualify the agency as an "arm" of the state include (1) state statutory definitions;
(2) the number of school boards within the state; (3) the extent of control and guidance
exercised by the state over the school board; (4) the power of the school boards to issue
bonds and levy taxes subject to certain state restrictions; and (5) the amount of state financial assistance. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 28081 (1977) (relying on provisions in the Ohio Revised Code Annotated). The last element
was set forth by the Court in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 551 (1974) holding that if the
source of funds used to satisfy the judgment was paid out of the state treasury the board
would be an "arm" of the state.
2. 777 F.2d 1403 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 66 (1986).
3. The Garcia court also discussed appellant's defamation counterclaim in detail. See
infra notes 15 to 24 and accompanying text.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
5. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1405. The board met on February 11, 1980, and at that meet-

DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW

[Vol. 64:2

named as defendants the school board and its members in both their
individual and official capacities. 6 Initially, the school board gave no
public reason for its decision not to renew Garcia's contract. The plaintiff publicly stated, however, that his nonrenewal resulted from his refusal of the board's request to engage in illegal activities. 7 The board
the reamembers then responded by drafting a statement explaining
8
sons for their decision not to renew Garcia's contract.
The plaintiff filed suit alleging a violation of his first amendment
rights and a deprivation of liberty and property without due process of
0
law. 9 The school board members counterclaimed for defamation.'
The jury awarded the plaintiff $180,000.00 and the defendants nothing,
from which the defendants appealed and the plaintiff cross-appealed. I"
After filing appellate briefs, the board amended its position, asserting immunity from suit under the eleventh amendment to the United
States Constitution.' 2 This defense was raised but not pursued at the
trial court.1i Affirming in part and reversing in part, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the eleventh amendment barred suit against
the board and its members in their official capacities.1 4 The court further held that the board members were public officials and could not
recover on their defamation claim unless "actual malice" could be
shown. 15
II.
A.

THE COURT'S OPINION

Defamation

The majority opinion, delivered per curiam, discussed several issues
involving defamation. Initially, the court addressed the board members'
challenge to the trial court's jury instruction regarding their defamation
ing, they voted four to one not to renew Mr. Garcia's contract. Mr. Gallegos voted against
the motion not to renew the superintendent's contract, and the four defendant board
members voted in favor. Appellant's Brief in Chief at 2, Garcia v. Board of Educ., 777
F.2d 1403 (10th Cir. 1985) (No. 82-1174), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 66 (1986).
6. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1405. Following three different conversations with the trial
court judge, Garcia voluntarily dismissed the suit against the individuals before the case
went to the jury. See id. at 1405-06.

7. Appellee's Answer Brief at 3, Garcia v. Board of Educ., 777 F.2d 1403 (10th Cir.
1985) (No. 82-1174), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 66 (1986).
8. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1405. The reasons given by the board included (1) constituents had continually expressed dissatisfaction with Mr. Garcia; (2) the conduct of the superintendent had been detrimental to staff morale; (3) Mr. Garcia had become increasingly
unresponsive over the years and it had become more difficult to work with him. Id.
9. Id. at 1404-05.
10. Id. at 1405.
11. Id.
12. The eleventh amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.
13. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1405.
14. Id. at 1408-09.
15. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs 737-76 (4th ed. 1979).
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claim. 1 6 As the court noted, the defendant board members were required to overcome certain aspects of New York Times v. Sullivan. 17 Arguing the need to prove only common law negligence, however, the
defendants claimed that they were not public officials and therefore
were not subject to the New York Times "actual malice" standards. In
response, the court reviewed the accepted tests to determine public official status as set forth in Rosenblatt v. Baer.18 For example, the public
official designation applies to those persons in governmental hierarchy
who "have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for
or control over the governmental affairs."' 19
Despite the school board's effort to dodge the definitional boundaries of public official status, the court held that the school board and its
members were considered public officials. Relying on Rosenblatt, the
Garcia court found that governance of a public school system was of the
utmost importance, and that strong public interest warranted the con20
clusion that the board members were public officials.
In addition, the majority addressed the issue of whether a public
official suing for defamation can obtain a judgment against a nonmedia
critic as opposed to a media critic. By examining the holdings in several
cases, 2 ' the court concluded that first amendment protection should de22
pend on the subject of the speech and not the identity of the speaker.
Finally, the issue of the necessary standard of proof was addressed
by the court. Relying in part on the New York Times decision, the majority held that the difficulty in defining "media," the concern for preserving constitutional values and the undesirability of allowing greater
constitutional protection for the media, merits the application of an "actual malice" standard when a public official sues a nonmedia defendant
for defamation. 23 The court, therefore, decided that correct instructions were given to the jury and that the defendants could only recover
on their counterclaim if actual malice was shown. Having exhausted the
discussion of defamation, the court proceeded to the issues raised under
the eleventh amendment.
B.

The Majority View of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
In the earlier decision of Edelman v. Jordan,24 the Supreme Court

16. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1407. The trial court instructed the jury that in order to recover on their defamation claim, the school board members, as public officials, were required to prove that Mr. Garcia's statement was made with "actual malice."
17. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
18. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
19. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1408 (citing Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966)).
20. Id.; see also Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85.
21. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1409-11. The cases considered by the court include: Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); and Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
22. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1410.
23. Id. at 1411.
24. 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The defendants were two former directors of the Illinois
Department of Public Aid, the Comptroller of Cook County and the Director of the Cook
County Department of Public Aid. In view of the Court's decision that the eleventh
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observed that, despite defendant's failure to pursue an eleventh amendment defense at the trial court level, the defense is jurisdictional and
may be raised for the first time on appeal or if raised and abandoned, it
may nonetheless be argued on appeal. 2 5 Relying on Edelman2 6 the Garcia court, although sympathetic to the plaintiff's position, recognized the
limitations placed on it by precedent.
The court then turned to the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, 2 7 and
noted that, with the exception of eight classes, 28 governmental immunity had been statutorily reinstated. After examining the limitations on
waiver of immunity by other sections of the New Mexico statutes, 2 9 the
court concluded that the school board's attorney was without the authority to waive sovereign immunity, and that the school board was not
estopped from raising an eleventh amendment defense.
After resolving these issues, the court turned its attention to determining whether the local school board members in their official capacity
enjoyed protection under the state's eleventh amendment sovereign immunity. Following Edelman v. Jordan,30 the Tenth Circuit held that a
non-consenting state was immune from suit brought in federal court by
its own citizens as well as by citizens of another state. In addition, the
court, citing Monell v. Department of Social Services, 3 1 observed that state
agencies and boards acting in their official capacities were protected
from suit under the eleventh amendment. A dilemma arose, however, in
determining whether the board or agency is acting on a state or local
level. If it is determined to be "local" as defined by case law, eleventh
32
amendment immunity is not available.
The pivotal point in the decision arose when the court addressed
the issue of whether New Mexico school boards were facets of the state
or of the local government. The court virtually bypassed the entire issue, however, by claiming that it had already been raised and decided in
34
33
both Martinez v. Board of Education and Maestas v. Board of Education.
amendment prohibited the award of retroactive relief, the Court apparently felt it unnecessary to discuss whether the defendants and their agencies were entitled to raise the defense of the eleventh amendment in the first place. Conceivably, while the State
Department and officials could raise the defense, the county officials might not. The Court
did not discuss whether the county officials and their departments were the alter egos of
the state. The Court categorized all the defendants as "state officials" without further distinction. Id.
25. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 677-78.
26. 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (An eleventh amendment defense may be raised at any time in
the proceeding).
27. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-4 to 25 (1978).
28. There is an exception to the immunity granted under N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4
(1978) for injury or damage caused by a public employee during the operation or maintenance of (1) motor vehicles, aircraft and watercraft; (2) buildings, public parks, machinery,
equipment and furnishings; (3) airports; (4) public utilities; (5) medical facilities; (6) health
care providers; (7) highways and streets; or (8) law enforcement officers.
29. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-13 to 25 (1978).
30. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
31. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
32. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1407 (citing Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978)).
33. 748 F.2d 1393 (10th Cir. 1984).
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According to the Tenth Circuit, it was bound by the Martinez and Maestas
decisions that consider New Mexico school boards to be arms of the
state. The Garcia court, therefore concluded that the eleventh amendment barred suit against the school board and its members in their official capacities. 35 Based on this analysis, the judgment was reversed and
remanded for dismissal on the grounds of eleventh amendment immunity, and the verdict against the counter-claimant was affirmed.
C. Judge McKay: An Alternate View
Although Judge McKay concurred with the majority's holding regarding non-variance in the standard of proof for defamation and the
timeliness of the eleventh amendment defense, he disagreed with the
majority's reasoning in allowing a local school board eleventh amendment immunity. 3 6 Judge McKay asserted that the local school board

should be viewed as a local entity, as the members are locally elected or
appointed and render decisions regarding the governance of local
37
schools.
McKay noted that the majority's problem in determining which local units are similar to municipalities and therefore not protected by the
eleventh amendment began with the court's reference to Monell v. Department of Social Services. 3 8 To the contrary, McKay would have focused
on the Supreme Court's decision in Mt. Healthy City School District Boardof
Education v. Doyle. 39 According to the dissent, Mt. Healthy was the foundational opinion in developing a two-part balancing test to differentiate
state alter egos from local governmental units. As Judge McKay explained, the test consists of determining to what extent the board functions autonomously from the state government, and the extent to which
the agency is financially independent of the state treasury. 40 Citing
Edelman v. Jordan,Judge McKay reiterated that if the money for the judgment against the board would be paid from the state treasury, then the
board may be immune from suit. 4 1 McKay observed, however, that the
"majority relied upon the source of the funds" standard to the exclusion
42
of other factors emphasized in prior case law.
34. 749 F.2d 591 (10th Cir. 1984).
35. The majority is not alone in its view. For example, the following cases have also
held school boards to be alter egos of states: Harris v. Tooele County School Dist., 471
F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1973); Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962); O'Neill v. Early,
208 F.2d 286 (4th Cir. 1953).
36. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1411 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
37. The following cases have held school boards not to be alter egos of the state:
Adams v. Rankin County Bd. of Educ., 524 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 438 U.S. 904 (1978); Fabrizio & Martin, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 290 F. Supp. 945
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
38. 436 U.S. 658 (1977).
39. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
40. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1412 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280-81).
41. Id. (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974)).
42. Id. at 1412 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Mt.
Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280-81.
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The majority based its opinion on the Tenth Circuit's decisions in
Martinez and Maestas.4 3 As the dissent recognized, these two cases held
that New Mexico school boards are state entities despite the fact that
other cases, addressing identical circumstances, have reached the opposite conclusion. 4 4 Judge McKay summed up the variations in the treatment between similarly
situated school districts in two words"absolutely ridiculous." 4 5 Furthermore, he noted the majority's failure
to recognize the importance of the Mt. Healthy decision to the Garcia
case, particularly as it related to the functions of the school board as set
forth in the New Mexico statutes. 4 6 From his reading of the statute, McKay concluded that the New Mexico statutory scheme shows a clear in-7
4
tent to maintain local control over the schools and school boards.
Thus, the dissent stated that the majority, by focusing on the source of
funds for the judgment, had ignored the crucial issue of determining
control.
Additionally, the dissent illustrated the confusion that arises in attempting to isolate the source of the funds. After discussing the relevant
sections of both the New Mexico Tort Claims Act 48 and the New Mexico
Public Liability Funds statutory provision, 49 Judge McKay dismissed the
statutes as inapplicable to the case at hand. He reached this conclusion
by reasoning that although there is a constitutional provision governing
the state's satisfaction of judgments, it does not necessarily extend to
suits for violations of federal constitutional rights. Since neither statute
clearly authorized the payment of a federal court judgment in an action
involving constitutional rights, 50 Judge McKay concluded that there was
no clear indication of how such a judgment would be paid. McKay believed that, due to this surrounding uncertainty, eleventh amendment
immunity should not depend on the source of the funds for payment of
51
a judgment.
Having exhausted the source of funds issue, the dissent again
stressed that the degree to which a local entity acts independently of the
43. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
44. The dissent compared the Tenth Circuit decisions in Stoddard v. School Dist. No.
1, 590 F.2d 829 (10th Cir. 1979) and Unified School Dist. No. 480 v. Epperson, 583 F.2d
1118 (10th Cir. 1978), holding school boards to be local because judgments were to be
paid from special levies raised within the district itself with a Utah case where the school
board was held to be a state entity because of the "possibility" of ajudgment being paid, at
least partially, out of state funds. See Harris v. Tooele County School Dist., 471 F.2d 218
(10th Cir. 1973). McKay concluded that the only significant difference was that the Utah

school districts were not required to levy taxes to pay liabilities. Thus, the judgment
"might" have to be paid by the states. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1413 (McKay, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
45. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1413 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-4 (1978).

47. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1413 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-1 to 27 (1978).
49.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-23 (1978).

50. See Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1416 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(the dissent discusses Article 8, section 7 of the New Mexico Constitution and selected
portions of the New Mexico statutes).
51. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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state is a major factor in determining whether the eleventh amendment
applies. Reiterating the approach taken in Mt. Healthy 52 and Unified
School District No. 480 v. Epperson,53 McKay restated his position that
where the state controls a local body to the extent of making decisions
that affect the constitutional rights of its citizens, the eleventh amendment should apply. If, however, the school board functions independently of the state, then immunity under the eleventh amendment
should not be available. The dissent further maintained that in order
for immunity to apply, the state must maintain actual control over the
board. General supervision over the board's actions would not be sufficient. McKay concluded by stating that the New Mexico school boards
act independently of the state in day-to-day management. 5 4 The general supervision that the state provides is not sufficient to qualify the
school board for protection under the eleventh amendment. Thus, McKay determined that the New Mexico school board is subject to suit, and
55
he would have affirmed the trial court's decision.
III.
A.

BACKGROUND

Pre-Garcia

It is doubtful that Justice Blackstone was aware of the imprint he
would leave on American jurisprudence when in 1765 he coined the
phrase "The King can do no wrong." '5 6 For centuries Blackstone's
phrase has been the foundation for the doctrine of sovereign or governmental immunity. This doctrine has insulated both individual public officials and state and local governments from suit.

Under the original doctrine of governmental immunity, which has
been captured in the eleventh amendment, the state and its political
subdivisions were amenable to suit only if they consented to such. From
its earliest inception, the doctrine barred the recovery of an aggrieved
plaintiff from a sovereign defendant without consideration of the cause

of action or merits of the case. Recognizing the inherent injustice that
52. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280-81 (four factors used to determine the extent of an
agency's autonomy).
53. 583 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1978).
54. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1417 (McKay, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55. McKay ignored the plaintiffs assertion that the trial court erred in submitting
other constitutional issues to the jury. The plaintiffs failure to sustain his burden of
showing that his interest in free speech was a major factor in the school board's decision,
McKay noted, was fatal to his first amendment claim. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1417 (McKay, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 284-87). Similarly, McKay rejected the property interest issue on the basis that a property interest does
not exist in the mere hope or expectation of contract renewal. To succeed on the liberty
interest claim, the reasons for dismissal must stigmatize the plaintiffs reputation or foreclose future employment opportunities. Id. at 1418 (McKay, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Should such a stigma result, due process requires that an opportunity
to be heard be provided. Cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-10 (1976) (mere injury to
reputation alone was not deprivation of plaintiffs "liberty" interest). McKay concluded
that it could not be said as a matter of law that the trial court erred in submitting the
constitutional issues to the jury.
56. 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 516 (1923).

406
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occurred from such lack of consideration, courts began to modify5 7 the
absolute immunity maxim. The modifications occurred on a state-bystate basis and involved everything from complete abrogation to total
acceptance of immunity. Further, the stringent theory of "The King can
do no wrong" which was prevalent in the Blackstone era, has been tempered with sensitivity to individual rights. One indication of such temperance was the passage of section 1983.
B.

Section 1983

Originally called the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,58 section 1983 is
the section of the Civil Rights Act under which Garcia alleged violations
of his first amendment rights. Garcia also asserted that the defendants
deprived him of liberty and property without due process. 59 Section
1983 was initially enacted to provide a measure of federal control over
state and territorial officials who were reluctant to enforce state laws
against persons violating the rights of newly freed slaves and union sympathizers. Creating a right of action in the federal courts against local
government officials provided a neutral forum for an aggrieved citizen
60
to present his complaint.
In general, section 1983 serves as an enforcement provision for the
fourteenth amendment. 6' The two primary elements of this provision,
as explained by the Supreme Court, are (1) the deprivation of a federal
right and, (2) that the person caused the deprivation while acting under
color of state or territorial law. 6 2 Other elements of a section 1983 action include proof of proximate cause 63 and redress. 64 Usually, this last
57. One modification included separating the sovereignty of public entities' functions
from the general class of sovereign activity. Thus, a harm caused by a public employee
engaged in an activity not deemed sovereign was not granted immunity. A second modification involved the development of a waiver of immunity thereby consenting to the suit.
Such consent was inferred from actions on the government's part such as purchasing liability insurance. Patula, The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act: A Prescriptionfor Regression,
49 DEN. L.J. 567, 567-68 (1971).
58. H.R. REP. No. 548, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2609.
59. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1404.
60. See supra note 52.
61. Section 1983 operates on a "double incorporation" principle by incorporating the
fourteenth amendment which has been construed to incorporate selected provisions of the
Bill of Rights. Thus, this provision affords a civil remedy for the constitutional amendments incorporated into the due process clause and applied to the states. See generally, S.
NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO SECTION 1983 § 2.03
(Cum. Supp. 1982).
62. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The Court observed "These elements reflect a congressional judgment that damages remedied against the offending party
is a vital component of any scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees."
Id.
63. The need to show proximate cause was the result of the Court's decision in Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 463 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978) (requiring that the plaintiff show
a causal relationship between defendant's conduct and the alleged deprivation of rights).
64. To successfully maintain a section 1983 suit, a plaintiff must show actual damage
resulting from defendant's conduct. See, e.g., Corriz v. Baranjo, 667 F.2d 892 (10th Cir.
1982).
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element is satisfied by showing that the defendant's conduct caused
some actual damages.
A defense of immunity can be raised to defeat an otherwise valid
section 1983 claim. Such a defense can be presented in two ways: absolute immunity or qualified immunity. 6 5 Absolute immunity protects the
defendant entirely from any liability for damages asserted under section
1983. Qualified immunity, on the other hand, only protects a defendant
whose actionable conduct was undertaken in good faith. 6 6 Although the
immunity defenses were originally available to both individuals and governmental entities faced with a federal civil rights action, in recent years
such immunities have been narrowed to protect only individual defend67
ants, and only against damages.
C.

Eleventh Amendment
Article III of the Constitution provides, in part, that "[t]hejudicial

Power [of the United States] shall extend ...

to Controversies . . .be-

tween a State and Citizens of another State ....,,68 The United States
Supreme Court was called upon to decide if article III implied that a
state could be sued in assumpsit in federal court by a citizen of another
state. 69 In the early decision of Chisholm v. Georgia,70 the Court, despite
the existence of common law sovereign immunity, held that a state could
be sued in a federal court by a citizen of another state. 7 ' However, in
order to reinstate the doctrine of sovereign immunity to the states, and
in response to the Court's holding in Chisholm, the eleventh amendment
was passed by Congress in 1798.72 By its terms, the eleventh amendment affords protection from suits by citizens of another state, but does
not provide protection for states sued in federal court by their own citi73
zens. The Supreme Court addressed this problem in Hans v. Louisiana.
The Court in Hans held that states should also enjoy eleventh amendment protection from suits brought in federal court by their own citizens. 74 Despite the expanded protection given to the states, the Court
did not view its decision as an extension of eleventh amendment coverage. 75 Rather, the Court reiterated that the amendment served to affirm
a state's sovereign immunity.
Notwithstanding the Court's posture in Chisholm and Hans, there re65. Rader, Section 1983, The Civil Rights Action: Legislative andJudicial directions, 15 CuM.

L.

REV.

571, 610 (1985).

66. Id. at 611-13 (discussion of absolute and qualified immunity).
67. Id. at 610-11.
68. U.S. CONST. art. III § 2.
69. Silfen, Constitutional Law - The Eleventh Amendment as Applied to State Agencies: A
Survey of the Cases and a Proposed Model for Analysis, 22 VILL. L. REV. 153, 153-54 (1976-77).
70. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
71. Id. at 420. Chisholm, a citizen of South Carolina, bought an action as executor of
the estate of Farquhar, also a South Carolina citizen, on a claim for goods delivered to the
state of Georgia for which no payment was received.
72. See supra note 12.
73. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 12-14.
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mained an uncertainty as to the level of protection being provided by
the eleventh amendment. The line between permissible and impermissible action was more clearly defined by the Supreme Court in Edelman v.
Jordan.76 Though not a school board case, Edelman set the pace for later
decisions regarding the eleventh amendment. Specifically, the plaintiff
in Edelman brought an action against two Illinois state officials. The suit
alleged deprivation and untimely payment by defendants of the plain77
tiff's monthly assistance program checks.
Based on its reading of eleventh amendment history, the Court concluded that "the rule has evolved that a suit by private parties seeking to
impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state
treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.''78 Emphasizing the
agency's financial status, the Court held that the eleventh amendment
constituted a bar to the retroactive decree ordered by the district
court. 7 9 Thus, the Edelman Court, though intending to clarify the application of the eleventh amendment, instead created more confusion regarding its applicability.
Further confusion arose in 1978 when the Court again was confronted in Monell v. Department of Social Services80 with determining what
circumstances give rise to eleventh amendment protection. Having previously held that states as well as state officials and agencies were subject
to eleventh amendment protection, the Court focused on the circumstances under which such protection may be available to state officials
and agencies. The plaintiffs in Monell were pregnant women employed
by the New York State Department of Social Services and the Board of
Education. They sought redress for being required to take unpaid leave
of absence before such leaves were medically necessary. The Monell
Court set forth the rule that if an agency is the alter ego8 1 of the state,
then it enjoys eleventh amendment immunity. If, however, the agency is
determined to be local in nature as defined by case law, it will not enjoy
eleventh amendment immunity. 82 Thus, Monell narrowed the applicability of eleventh amendment immunity by establishing a dichotomy between state and local functions to be determined by the relationship
83
between the state and the entity being sued.
76. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
77. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants, agency employees of the Illinois Department of Public Aid, authorized grants only in the months during which the applications
were approved, and that they failed to follow the time regulations for processing applications. Id. at 653-56.
78. Id. at 663.
79. Id. at 668.
80. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
81. The term "alter-ego" has often been used by the courts to mean that the agency
embodies the attributes of the state and is entitled to its protection under the eleventh
amendment. See, e.g., George R. Whitten Jr., Inc. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 493 F.2d
177, 180 (1st Cir. 1974) (quoting Charles Simkin & Sons, Inc. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund,
352 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)).
82. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1407.
83. Id.
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The "Alter Ego" Concept

The alter ego issue was expanded by the Supreme Court in Mt.
Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle. 84 The Court offered guidelines to be used in determining whether an entity is entitled
to protection under the eleventh amendment. Similar to the circumstances in Garcia,8 5 the plaintiff in Mt. Healthy was an untenured teacher
who was discharged under alleged violations of her civil rights. Among
the events leading up to the section 1983 action were: An altercation
with another teacher, arguments with employees, swearing and obscene
gestures to students and a phone call made by the plaintiff to a radio
station to discuss a faculty memorandum relating to teacher dress and
appearance. The radio station subsequently announced the adoption of
a school dress code as a news item. Thereafter, the defendant school
board advised the plaintiff he would not be rehired and cited his lack of
tact regarding professional matters, with specific reference to the two
86
unfavorable incidents, as grounds for its decision.
Claiming a violation of his rights under the first and fourteenth
amendments, the plaintiff brought an action against the school board.
The district court found in favor of the plaintiff, and the decision was
affirmed on appeal.8 7 Disagreeing with the district court's posture on
the school board's eleventh amendment immunity claim, 88 the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether such immunity extends to school
boards .89
On appeal, the Court addressed the issue of whether the Mt.
Healthy Board of Education should be viewed as an arm, or alter ego, of
the State and thus entitled to eleventh amendment immunity, or instead
as a municipal corporation or other political subdivision that does not
enjoy the shield of the eleventh amendment. 90 In its brief discussion,
the Court determined that "[t]he answer depends, at least in part, upon
the nature of the entity created by state law." 9 ' The Court pointed out
that under Ohio law, the term "State" does not include "political subdivisions," of which local school districts are considered members. 92 The
Court also noted that Ohio had many local school boards of which the
defendant was only one. The defendant school board was, however,
84. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
85. See supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text.
86. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 274 (although not detailed in the case, the altercation with
the other teacher resulted from an obscene gesture by the respondent).
87. The district court concluded that the telephone call to the radio station was clearly
protected by the first amendment and that because it had played a substantial part in the
board's decision not to rehire the plaintiff, he was entitled to reinstatement with back pay.
Id. at 276.
88. The district court evaded the issue of whether the eleventh amendment applied to
school boards. The court maintained that application of the eleventh amendment was
irrelevant to the case because, even if it did exist, it had been waived by the board. Id. at
279-80.
89. Id. at 280.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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subject to some guidance from the Ohio State Board of Education and
received significant revenue from the state. 93 Finally, the local school
boards had power to levy taxes and issue bonds. Based on these findings, the Court concluded that the Ohio school board was not entitled to
immunity under the eleventh amendment because "[o]n balance, the
record ... indicates that a local school board such as petitioner is more
like a county or city than it is like an arm of the State."'9 4 Thus, Mt.
Healthy established some of the factors to consider in determining an
entity's status under the eleventh amendment. 95
E.

Cases Since Mt. Healthy

Since Mt. Healthy, several courts have addressed the issue of
whether a particular school board or district is entitled to eleventh
amendment immunity. For example, in Unified School District No. 480 v.
Epperson,9 6 the Tenth Circuit resolved a dispute initiated by two school
teachers against a Kansas school district. The teachers claimed that
their teaching contracts were not renewed in retaliation for their exercise of first amendment rights. The Epperson court set forth that "the
powers, nature, and characteristics of the board or agency must be critically examined under state law." It further held that courts must examine: "(1) To what extent does the board, although carrying out a state
mission, function with substantial autonomy from the state government
and, (2) to what extent is the agency financed independently of the state
treasury." 9 7 Applying these factors to the case, the Epperson court held
that: (1) because an award of damages would be paid not by the state but
by a special levy within the defendant school district, and (2) because the
defendant was only supervised and not controlled by the state board of
education, the defendant was not immune from suit under the eleventh
amendment. 98
The eleventh amendment alter ego issue was also raised in Stoddard
v. School District No. 1.99 In this case, the Tenth Circuit was presented
with a suit by a schoolteacher against a Wyoming school district, members of the board of trustees, and a principal, alleging nonrenewal of her
contract for reasons violative of the first and fourteenth amendments. ' 0 0
Reiterating the Court's holding in Mt. Healthy, the Tenth Circuit court
stated that "[t]he School District in the instant case is 'more like a city or
county than it is like an arm of the state.' "101 Thus, the Wyoming
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. For a general discussion of the factors that have been the basis for other courts'
decisions regarding whether a school board is the alter-ego of the state, see Comment,
State Governmental Corporation Immunity from FederalJurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment,
72 DICK. L. REV. 296 (1968).
96. 583 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1978).
97. Id. at 1121-22 (citations omitted).
98. Id. at 1123.
99. 590 F.2d 829 (10th Cir. 1979).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 835 (citations omitted).
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school district was not an arm of the state, and was therefore not entitled
to eleventh amendment immunity.
The alter ego issue was also raised by the Fifth Circuit in Moore v.
Tangipahoa Parish School Board.10 2 Although the facts differed slightly
from the Mt. Healthy, Epperson, and Stoddard cases, the conclusion was the
same. In a class action desegregation case against a Louisiana school
board, the Moore court noted several factors which exhibited the boards'
local character 10 3 and held that Louisiana school boards were autonomous political subdivisions and not alter egos of the state from the
standpoint of sovereign immunity.
Finally, the alter ego issue was considered in Travelers Indemnity Co.
v. School Board of Dade County. 104 The facts involved an action by a surety
0 5
based on a performance bond against the county board of education.
Notwithstanding the facts of the case, the Travelers court quoted the Fifth
Circuit, stating:
[t]he Eleventh Amendment does not bar [a plaintiff] from such
award so long as the entities sued are locally controlled, essentially local in character, and funds to defray the awards would
not be derived primarily from the State Treasury. (Citations
omitted). Our analysis of the nature of Florida School Boards
in the context of determining their similarity to municipalities
is sufficient to convince us that they are not the type
of entities
10 6
which are sheltered by the Eleventh Amendment.
Based on these standards, the court concluded that nothing in the nature of the county school boards in Florida would entitle it to eleventh
10 7
amendment protection.
IV.

ANALYSIS:

GARCIA'S EFFECT UNDER EXISTING LAW

The Tenth Circuit Court's decision in Garcia with regard to the alter
ego issue disregards the Supreme Court's holding in Mt. Healthy. The
Garcia opinion, though not the first to stray' 0 8 from the Mt. Healthy and
Epperson decisions, represents a substantial detour from accepted standards. The decision also ignores relevant public policy issues.
In a cursory manner, the Garcia majority addressed the eleventh
amendment alter ego issue, and then disposed of the matter based on
102. 594 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1979).
103. The Moore court noted the following:
[1] Louisiana school boards, such as the defendants, have the power to sue and be
sued . . . [2] they have the power to contract . . . [3] they have the power to
purchase, hold and sell property ... [4] they have the power to borrow funds ...
[5] they have the power to levy and collect taxes from which back pay claims can
be met.
Id. at 493-94 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting the district judge in Smith v. Concordia Parish
School Bd., 387 F. Supp. 887, 891 (W.D. La. 1975)).
104. 666 F.2d 505 (11th Cir. 1982).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 507 (quoting Campbell v. Gadsen County Dist. School Bd., 534 F.2d 650,
655-56 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 539 F.2d 710 (1976)).
107. Id. at 508.
108. See supra note 35.
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prior holdings in Martinez v. Board of Education 10 9 and Maestas v. Board of
Education."10 Unfortunately, the cases relied upon most heavily by the
Garcia court handle the eleventh amendment issue inadequately. Thus,
the resultant weakness seeps over into Garcia.
Close examination of the Martinez opinion reveals the inherent flaws
in the court's analysis. Specifically, the Martinez court recognized the
need to decide whether New Mexico school boards were local in nature
or were controlled by the state board. Rather than examining the powers and responsibilities allocated to the local boards by statute,"' the
court selectively examined six duties delegated to the state board by the
legislature. 1i2
From this brief examination of the selected duties, and in conjunction with Art. XII, section 6, of the New Mexico Constitution, the court
concluded that the state had extremely broad powers over public
schools. 1'3 The court did recognize, however, and pay lip service to the
fact that some of the provisions of the New Mexico statutes were identical to those analyzed in Mt. Healthy. However, the court claimed that the
enumerated powers found in Mt. Healthy "were not in the context of the
state board's 'control, management, and direction.' '"'14
Finally, the Martinez court agreed that issuing bonds for capital improvements was a significant concern, and that the local boards had the
initial decision of whether or not to provide for such improvements.
Once again, the court skirted the issue of local control by noting that the
right to approve bond issues rested with the state depending on the type
of bonds proposed. 1 5 As a result, the court held that the local boards
were arms of the state system of education.
The Garcia court found favor with the reasoning applied by the Martinez and Maestas courts and relied heavily on these decisions. Such reliance, however, led the court to a decision that might have been altered
by a more thorough investigation. Specifically, the Garcia court would
have been well advised to review and discuss the sixteen functions allo109. 748 F.2d 1393 (10th Cir. 1984).
110. 749 F.2d 591 (10th Cir. 1984).
111.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-4 (1978).

112. The seven duties selectively examined by the court included:
(1) designate courses of instruction taught in all public schools in the state;
(2) determine the qualifications for.., any person teaching.., or administering
in public schools according to law ...a system of classification adopted ...by the
state board; (3) suspend or revoke a certificate held by an... instructor or administrator according to law for incompetency, immorality or for any other good and
just cause; (4) prescribe courses of instruction, requirements for graduation and
standards for all public schools; (5) accept and receive all grants of money from
the federal government ...and disburse the money; (6) adopt regulations for the
administration of all public schools; and (7) provide for management ...to operate any public school or school district which has failed to meet requirements of
law, state board standards or state board regulations.
Martinez, 748 F.2d at 1394-95.
113. Id. at 1394.
114. Id. at 1395.
115. Id.
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6
cated to local schools by the New Mexico legislative scheme. "
The dissent recognized the importance of considering these factors.
Had the majority reviewed the statute, their outlook on the Garcia case
may have been altered. For example, the New Mexico statutes allow the
local school boards to employ a superintendent, to fix the superintendent's salary, to fix the salary of all employees, to acquire and dispose of
property, to issue general obligation bonds of the school district, and to
adopt regulations pertaining to the administration of all powers or duties of the local school board.11 7 These functions are clearly local in
nature, and require, only "some guidance" from the state board. 1 18
Therefore, according to the Mt. Healthy rationale, immunity based on
state control is lacking.
In addition, not only does the Garcia decision ignore Mt. Healthy,
but the decision also departs from similarly situated cases in other circuits."i 9 Ultimately, Garcia serves to complicate and blur the view of
who or what is entitled to protection under the eleventh amendment.
The opinion provides a lenient application of eleventh amendment immunity, yet fails to provide a stabilized definition of what constitutes an
alter ego. As it stands, the Garcia opinion can best be analogized to a
newborn foal attempting to stand for the first time: there exists the desire to achieve a goal, but without the necessary support, the attempt is
wobbly and the result is to fall back to the position from which he
started.

V.

BEYOND GARCIA

Notwithstanding Garcia, section 1983 and subsequent cases 120 exemplify a movement away from "The King can do no wrong" to an era
that recognizes the responsibility of local school board members for
their decisions. Threat of suit for wrongful conduct by school board
officials effects both the type and the quality of the decisions school
board members make. Further, such shifts influence the preparation
that board members must undergo in taking office, as they will be held
accountable for protecting the rights of persons employed by the school
and of students enrolled in it. 12' Garcia, however, exempts board mem116.

See supra note 104.

117. Garcia, 777 F.2d at 1414 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-4 (1978)).
118. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280.
119. See supra notes 102-107 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (school officials held liable for
violation of student's constitutional rights); Hickman v. Valley Local School Dist., 619 F.2d
606 (6th Cir. 1980) (reinstatement and back wages for teacher dismissed for exercise of
first amendment rights); Kingsville Independent School Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109
(5th Cir. 1980) (awarding reinstatement to a teacher who sued the school board for violation of civil rights); Adelberg v. Labuszewski, 447 F. Supp. 267 (N.D. Il1. 1978) (money
damages awarded for violation of superintendent's civil rights).
121. The opposite side of the coin entails the notion that the threat of personal liability
for school board members interferes with the proper functioning of the educational system by inhibiting public officials in the performance of their duties including involving
school officials in legal battles for months or years. SeeJ. MAHONEY, SECTnON 1983: SWORD
AND SHIELD 318 (R. Freilich & R. Carlisle ed. 1983).
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bers from having to justify or defend the actions taken, as any such challenges will now be warded off with the eleventh amendment shield.
Under the umbrella of the eleventh amendment, the Garcia case
gives a higher priority to the protection of the school boards then to the
protection and compensation of individuals experiencing infringements
of civil and constitutional rights. The viability of such a decision remains questionable. Given the decisions that have emerged from other
jurisdictions, the Garcia court could have chosen several alternatives to
granting complete immunity. One such alternative is the qualification
of eleventh amendment immunity in situations involving school districts. For example, if total abrogation of eleventh amendment immunity is not desired, then perhaps a standard should be proposed which
obligates the New Mexico School Districts and Boards to compensate
plaintiffs for tortious activity committed by their employees. In essence,
the goal is to assure that a school board occupies no better position than
citizens do. Without doubt, circumstances will arise under which the
force of such a compensation principle will be suspended, thus, a system
122
of strict liability is not at issue.
Ultimately, a compensation principle enforced against the New
Mexico School Districts and school boards would help promote important societal goals. America's educational system strives to enlighten
the young and transform illiterates into literates while socializing individuals into various civil roles. 12 3 Since the school officials play a crucial
role in a vital part of America, it is only reasonable to expect some form
of accountability on the part of those officials. It is such accountability
that is lacking in the Garcia decision. In essence, the Garcia decision
reduces the accountability of those who influence the very heart of
American life.
Shaun Tara Duley-Gloude
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